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POTENTIALS AND PITFALLS IN COLLECTIVE FARM BARGAINING 
Bargaining as a concept is gainfng acceptance among farmers and farm 
leaders. There is no intent today to be a proponent or opponent of farmer 
bargaining or to discuss its mechanics. Rather, I will provide some ideas, 
some criteria, and some viable alternatives so you may make your decision 
regarding collective farm bargaining. 
Growth in bargaining is only one symptom, among many, of widespread 
changes occurring in agricultural marketing. The titles of the other papers 
''Live Animal Pricing" and "Big Changes in the Big Meat Market Centers" are 
recognition of substantial changes. We are coming face to face with the 
rapidly emerging issue of who will control the production and marketing of 
farm products. Closely related are pricing and coordination mechanisms. 
Bargaining is related to both pricing and coordination. Accordingly, I 
was asked to provide a background and framework that will assist in putting 
the total issue in prospective. 
THE SETTING 
The food sector has become highly specialized and industrialized with 
control of economic activity shifting as firms become larger and more capi-
tal intensive. Control is being centralized and concentrated through con-
tracts, leases, and vertical integration. Conglomerate firms are becoming 
more influential in organization, 'ownership and management of farm production 
and marketing. These developments, although limited, have brought into 
farming the full power of capital, technology, and business enterprise already 
present in more highly industrialized sectors.of the economy. These component 
include product and service development, brand differentiation, advertising, 
packaging, and other practices that are designed to create demand for a speeif 
product and then tailoring production and marketing accordingly. 
Farms have grown larger; some at:e much larger. Most are a two or three 
man operation or are of a relatively small proprietary type operation. In-
creasing technical complexity of agriculture, and economies of size requires 
more skill and more money and has been met by specialization in conmodities, 
technical c011111odity knowledge, and special credit sources. 
The increased incidence of vertical integration and contract production 
for some farm products is widely recognized. This tends to reduce the 
sovereignty of farmers. Less well recognized has been the industrialization 
of agriculture and the shift from marketing farm coanodities to marketing 
food and services. 
Many observe that coaaodity markets are gone on live broilers; comnoclity 
trading ended on eggs; support price-a used for some farm products; minimum 
milk pricing by federal market orders and super pools premium pricing by 
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milk cooperatives; and central markets almost gone for fruits and vegetables. 
Livestock terminal markets are declining in number and volume handled. Both 
buyers and suppliers have become much larger, some have diversified into 
food and non-food items, and some hav~ integrated vertically in extending the 
system of access to farm products. ·.· 
Beyond these changes are a transformation of processing, retailing, 
and marketing featuring product development, promotion and a brand battle. 
The incentives, targets, and practices used are strange to those selling 
products for a price in open markets. These changes tend to induce parallel 
or counteracting changes--including defensive measures like self-help programs 
and bargaining. 
The trends do not appear to be a temporary departure from the open 
market system and the small proprietary agriculture that has dominated farm 
organization for so long. The emerging issue is not whether to keep things 
as they are; it is neither desirable nor possible. Rather the issue is 
whether some version of dispersed farm production and marketing organization 
is to prevail or whether the control will be concentrated within a relatively 
small number of firms. 
A number of people are recognizing and wrestling with this highly 
complex issue. For our purposes some method of differentiating the control 
system is necessary. One is presented on a very tentative basis. 
1. Dispersed Control 
a. Open Markets 
b. Variations upon Open Markets 
2. Intermediate Systems of Control 
a. Group Control 
1) Marketing eooperatives 
2) Bargaining Groups 
b. Government Involvement 
1) Market Orders 
2) Marketing Boards 
3. Concentrated Control 
a. D>rizontally Structured Organizations 
b. Vertically Structured Organizations 
There are additional combinations of the above, not simply between the 
dispersed open market system, the intermediate system or the concentrated 
system organized either horizontally into giant farming corporations or 
vertically integrated systems. 
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~T IS BARGAINING?!/ 
Bargaining is negotiation between two or more opposing parties to 
arrive at prices and/or terms of trade or contracts. Bargaining is not 
decreeing but requires two or more parties negotiating over prices and 
terms of contracts. We have lots of individual bargaining but we are 
focusing today on group action, collective bargaining or organized efforts 
to improve prices or contractual arrangements. 
There are two distinct facets to bargaining: prices and terms of 
trade. We need briefly explore each to further develop the background and 
framework for all three papers. Then we will move to the potentials and 
pitfalls in farmer bargaining. 
Role of Prices 
In any economic system some means of coordination is necessary. There 
are at least two basic methods used in our s0ciety. One is the open market 
system. The second is an integrative system in which a firm or organization 
manages much of the coordination process from production to use. In actual 
practice there are numerous subtle shadings. 
Open Market. In the open or competitive market system prices arrived 
at in open competition between many buyers and sellers governs who gets 
the product, and prices are the basis for incentives and distribution of 
income. This system has been baste to agriculture, but has been modified 
by newer methods of selling and by governMnt programs. Open market trading 
is easiest to describe as central or terminal market trading, auctions or 
tele-auctions. Central or terminal markets a~ one time accounted for the 
bulk of the livestock marketed but has declined to about one-fourth of today's 
total. The central market was important for fruits, vegetables, cotton, wool 
and poultry products. Except for grain products most central markets appear 
to have passed their zenith. Auctions and tele-auctions perform the same 
functions but have not taken up the '!slack." 
The decline of central market trading in some products is being partially 
replaced by individual negotiations that take place in two major ways--direct 
selling and formula pricing. Direct selling has increased rapidly in live-
stock (note the demise of the Chicago stockyards) and in the selling of other 
farm products. One important feature of direct selling is the use of a "going 
price" and central markets typically provided them. But when amch of the 
product is sold direct, questions arise as to the validity of using the cen-
tral market or auction prices as the industry price. 
Formula pricing used in feeder and fed livestock sales features a 
price differential above or below a base price whether sold on a live or 
carcass basis. The base price is usually some designated quoted market 
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price. Again the "going price" is eroded as increasing numbers use formula 
pricing or sell direct. In some cases, notably eggs, there is no reliable 
market price to report. The fact that-livestock pricing mechanisms are to 
be discussed on this program testifiej·to concerns and changes in the method 
of determining value in the exchange of ownership. 
Integrative System. In the evolving integrative system one organization 
performs several of the product-flow coordinating functions. It may be a 
corporate firm or a farmer cooperative. It may operate through ownership, 
contracts, leasing or a combination of the methods. It may function largely 
by administrative decision including negotiation of contracts. 
According to the USDA about 95 percent of the milk and broilers are sold 
under integrative or contractual production; 70-75 percent of the processed 
vegetables, citrus fruits and sugar crops are contracted; 40-50 percent of 
the eggs, turkeys and potatoes; 20 percent of the cattle and 3 percent of the 
hogs. These products move directly to processors without open market trading. 
Terms of Trade 
If the marketing system were only a price system, bargaining would only 
negotiate prices. Price is often, but not always, the principle item to be 
negotiated. The terms of contractual production is of increasing concern 
since much of the milk, poultry, sugar beets, processing fruits and vegetables, 
and relatively small, but increasing portions of cattle, lambs and hogs are 
being produced under production cont~acts. The terms of the production con-
tract may specify which production practices are discretionary with the farmer 
and which are not; or specify grade standards, or who and how loss of quality 
in transit is borne, or how weights will be validated, or condemnations are 
handled, or services performed and other details. 
Production contracts have been negotiated most frequently by individuals 
directly with the integrator. The terms that are negotiated include produc-
tion practices and inputs to be supplied. One of the major concerns is the 
"going price" issue, another is who makes the determination. In addition to 
equality and justice, the potential loss of entrepreneurship and sovereignty 
worries some farmers. All these concerns increase the interest of all parties 
to seek alternative pricing mechanisms. ·collective bargaining is considered 
by some as a protective instrument in negotiating contracts. 
~T BAR.GAINING IS NOT 
From the foregoing it becomes evident that group bargaining may be a 
different way to arrive at price and other terms of trade for farm products. 
In contrast to other approaches it should be observed that group bargaining: 
1. Is not a price oriented open market system but an alternative or variant. 
2. Is not like an integrated conglomerate corporation that concentrates 
decision making power within a centralized authority. 
3. Is not cooperative marketing in that it negotiates terms of 
trade in contrast to doing the trading. 
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4. Is not unilateral action or decreeing prices or terms of trade 
since it must involve negotiation between two or more parties. 
CONDITIONS CONDUCIVE TO BARGAINING 
Bargaining or group action to negotiate prices and/or contract terms 
becomes a more likely choice when certain conditions are prevalent. See 
if they apply to cattle, hogs or lambs. These conditions include: 
1. Where the market departs from the open market system. For 
example, the price discovery system has virtually collapsed for eggs 
and some feel bargaining is a substitute method. 
2. Where the market is faced with concentrations of power. In 
this case, some feel a countervailing force is justified. 
3. Where the merchandising system uses promotion and advertising 
heavily to create value. Bargaining is considered an appropriate method 
by some to link the two unlike pricing sectors. 
4. Where pricing has given way to contracts. Some feel bargaining 
can perform a role to improve equity and price stability, especially 
where contract making is one way. 
5. Where there are recurrent waves of over-production. Some feel 
that bargaining can assist in stabilizing production. 
6. Where the marketing system requires a more orderly flow of 
farm products. Bargaining is not basically a_ product-flow device, but 
may perform this service. 
SOME POTENTIALS OF FARMER BARGAINING 
What are some of the potentials of farmer bargaining? The pitfalls 
will be discussed next. 
One of the most important aspects of bargaining is the effect it may 
have on the product price and cost structure within the marketing system. 
Successful bargaining will, in fact, realign costs, margins, profits, and 
prices. However, if bargaining is conducted primarily to replace a weak 
or unsatisfactory market pricing mechanism, the principle effect may be 
to restore stability and equity to the industry. There will be other 
consequences as the volume of a commodity may be altered and the profits 
and distribution of profits in the marketing system may be changed. If 
bargaining relates to broader aspects of marketing, including imp1:0vement 
of prices to producers, it will have much wider consequences. 
Our attention today is toward producer concerns. Among potential 
sources of income gains to farmers from effective collective bargaining 
are: 1) providing procurement services, 2) improving efficiency in marketing, 
and 3) increasing prices to consumers. 
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Procurement Services 
Bargaining groups may perform procurement services that offer savings 
or other advantages to buyers. The typical modern food processor operates 
plants with high fixed costs, spends l\eavily on brand promotion, and wants 
to reduce risk and uncertainty through a continuous flow of supplies. If 
the bargaining organization can deliver a continuous flow of an accepta•le 
quality-controlled product, thereby reducing procurement costs to the buyer, 
it is in a favorable position to negotiate higher prices to its members. 
The bargaining organization in addition to providing procurement 
services may improve the quality of information, assist in production 
decisions, arrange for distribution of product among buyers, provide 
grievance procedures, and/or discipline members. 
In a different sense, better management of the total supply can be 
a net gain to society. The unstable production cycles of many products 
(pork is a good example) are costly to producers during one phase of the 
cycle and costly to consumers at another. From society's point of view 
if stabilization could be achieved it would justify some net income gain 
to farmers. 
Efficiency in Marketing. Effective bargaining by farmers may spur 
efforts by marketing firms to seek savings from lower cost operations, i.e., 
higher operating efficiency. This is likely if marketing firms have 
previously been able to buy on a "soft market." They may have slipped 
into competitively wasteful practices such as duplicate assembly or de-
livery routes, elaborate promotional ~ctivities, or small, over-manned 
and under-mechanized plants. 
Effective collective bargaining liy farmer, probably will establish a 
uniform industry-wide price for the product supplied. Firms, therefore, 
would have an added incentive to eliminate wasteful practices, consolidate 
operations, and otherwise increase efficiency--all of which may sustain 
their incomes without increasing retail prices. 
On the other hand, some rigidities could develop from bargaining that 
reduce efficiencies and responsiveness to consumer demand. 
Higher Consumer Prices. Higher prices to consumers will be a major 
source of gain to producers. The possibilities and effects of increasing 
consumer price varies tremendously by coumodities. 
Obviously, the ideal setting for bargaining would be to improve 
procurement and marketing efficiencies enough to minimize pressures on 
either marketing firms or consumers. Equally obvious, this will not 
always be possible. In the majority of instances the opposite is the case. 
Bargaining then gives rise to, or shifts, various conflicts of interest. 
The following are examples: 1) If cOn.sumers pay higher prices for one 
product as a result of bargaining, they spend less on other products. This 
creates conflict with producers and marketers of the other products. 2) If 
processors and distributors can pass higher bargained prices on to consumers 
they will offer less resistance to farmers' bargaining efforts. Thereupon, 
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farmers will be affected more by consumers' demand responses. 3) If 
farmer bargaining groups are careful to negotiate uniform industry-wide 
prices, market firms may look more t~ard their competition with each 
other and less at that with farmers. 
SOME BARGAINING PITFALLS 
The kinds of sanctions and the internal solidarity needed by bargaining 
organizations to achieve their objectives will be directly proportional to 
the scale of what is sought. If the objectives are modest and can be mu-
tually advantageous to the opposing parties the wherewithal can be modest. 
If, on the other hand, the bargaining organization's objectives call for 
substantial gains that require more aggressive types of bargaining, certain 
pitfalls need to be recognized. Price gains from collective bargaining 
will vary substantially from one cOlllllodity to another due to differing 
market structures, supply conditions, producer responses, and consumer 
reactions. 
Production Response. The production response elicited by a substantial 
increase in farmers' prices and income could prove a troublesome pitfall. 
It should be noted that even with bargaining and negotiated prices the 
inefficient producers are going to have more financial or income problems than 
the efficient producers. For farm products with geographic and climatic 
restriction or highly specialized management and cultural practices, the 
production response may be minor. 'For many major farm products the response 
to negotiating prices substantially above the long run competitive level 
would be greater. 
Where a production response erodes the original price gains, a need 
would arise for mechanisms by which to store or divert short-term surpluses, 
and possibly to control output and/or limit entry. The quotas, allotments, 
and other features of a production control system would influence the level 
and distribution of income among present producers and determine entry 
requirements for new producers. 
Loss of Markets. Encouraging the development and use of substitutes 
may be one of the most serious pitfalls to aggressive bargaining. Substi-
tutes definitely limit the influence bargaining can have on price. Butter 
already has a readily available substitute; urea is substituted for soybean 
meal; synthetics are replacing natural fibers. Tobacco has no close sub-
stitute. Meat analogs could replace red meat. 
Recognition needs to be given to the state of substitute technology. 
Meat substitute technology exists. If red meat prices were bargained so 
aggressively as to encourage the production of meat substitutes, thus 
lowering the cost of the substitutes ~roduction, a substantial livestock 
market loss could occur. 
Even without market invasion by substitutes, consumers can turn 
away from a higher priced product. Consumer reactions to price increases 
vary widely from one farm product to another. For some products, there will 
be relatively small changes in use because of a price change. In others 
the use by consumers will respond sharply. 
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A different kind of market loss can result when only part of the 
production of a single cOlllDOdity is organized for bargaining. This could 
be the case where potato producers in~one area of the country bargain 
and those elsewhere do not. If the bargaining were overly aggressive, 
buyers could shift to other supplying areas. This could mean closing 
plants and shifting operations to the other producing regions. A loss 
of market to one set of producers, in these circumstances, is a gain to 
another. 
Foreign Market Considerations. For products such as feed grains, rice, 
wheat, soybeans, cotton, tobacco, hides and skins, tallow, lard, and some 
others, exports are a major market outlet. Maintaining them is crucial 
to the well-being of producers, and could be jeopardized by excessively 
high prices. Moreover, in the longer run another serious pitfall is the 
encouragement of a foreign production response. This would mean increased 
competition in world markets and perhaps even in domestic ones. For pro-
ducts that normally are imported, higher prices would attract larger imports 
unless trade-restrictive devices (tariffs and quotas) were imposed. 
Free Rider Problem. If collective bargaining is successful in achieving 
higher incomes and does not control supply or access to markets non-members 
who have not shared costs profit more than members. This erodes membership, 
encourages resentments between members and non-members and is a serious 
impediment to bargaining. 
SOME ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION 
There are three major courses of action open to those interested in 
pressing for farmer bargaining. They include: 1) voluntary associations, 
2) market order-cooperatives, and 3) marketing boards, or 4) modifications 
of the foregoing. There is a world of differences in the approaches. 
Voluntary Associations 
Voluntary bargaining associations are organized as unaffiliated, 
federated or unitarian groups. Most of the fruit and vegetable and dairy 
producer groups are unaffiliated. They go it along. The National Farmers 
Organization is an example of unitarian organization where a board based 
national group bas subdivisions organized to carry out the coamodity bar-
gaining functions. The American Agricultural Marketing Association is 
organized for bargaining purposes and is an affiliate of the American Farm 
Bureau. All tend to operate with advance delivery and/or production contracts 
negotiated with handlers. 
Bargaining associations generally do not become involved in ''marketing 
products" but represent producers in market analysis, information, contract 
negotiation and analysis. The primary concern is to arrive at contractual 
arrangements and most preferable production contracts. 
Voluntary bargaining associations in fruits and vegetables and milk 
have established some successes, some precedents and perspectives which 
tend to increase receptiveness to bargaining. Group bargaining in poultry 
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has progressed somewhat, but for meat animals and grains, bargaining is 
at best, only in its infancy. 
In the period ahead, the major pushes in voluntary bargaining 
associations may be two-fold. One may involve substantial efforts to 
increase membership and thus gain control of a larger portion of the 
output. The other effort may be to formalize the negotiation process. 
The difficulties in bargaining to date can be attributed largely to 
brevity of experience and lack of a formalized structure. These and other 
concerns have given rise to proposed legislation. One bill in Congress, 
primarily for voluntary bargaining associations benefits, is the Sisk Bill. 
It would create a bargaining board of three appointed members: 
1. With the power to certify the bargaining coamittee for an associa-
tion to producers with producer contracts. 
2. Which is financially sound. 
3. Controls sufficient production to be effective in bargaining. 
4. Acts as an agent in negotiations with handlers. 
5. Requires good faith bargaining. 
6. Includes anti-trust exemptions, and 
7. Woull extend market orders to all cOlllDOdities. 
The bill does not provide the authority for appointing a handler 
negotiating conmittee, does not require majority approval, does not provide 
authority for an exclusive bargaining agent, does not require compulsory 
settlement, does not have production control provisions, and does not 
prohibit handler purchases below negotiated prices. 
Marketing Orders-Cooperatives 
Bargaining is a dimension of market orders and has been used exten-
sively for milk and to some degree for fruits and vegetables. The close 
association of the market order and commodity cooperatives is not well 
understood. They are separate organizations, perform separate functions yet 
operate together for reciprocal advantages. 
Bargaining emerges from marketing orders as a visible consideration in 
the public hearing process; it appears as explicit provisions of the market-
ing order in quantity controls on fruits or prices on milk; and the coopera-
tives use the market order as a base for negotiating prices above the order 
price and for terms of trade. 
The fact milk cooperatives have succeeded in securing premiums above 
the market order price may induce other commodity groups to try to extend 
market order legislation to include their products. In general, cattle or 
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hogs meet the criteria considered important for effective market order 
programs. Required would be an amendment to the Marketing Act of 1937 
permitting inclusion for hogs or bee~. A bargaining association of 
producers or a cooperative would be required. 
The National Milk Producers Federation has sponsored a bill to extend 
their power--which already is considerable. This bill is designed exclu-
sively for milk but a brief description follows to emphasize not only one 
of the pitfalls of over-aggressive bargaining but to differentiate the 
alternative courses of action open to other co111Dodity groups interested 
in bargaining. 
The bill provides for 12 board members of which one would be appointed 
by the Secretary of Agriculture. Eleven would be elected; seven by pro-
ducers and four by handlers. The board would have the power to certify 
the exclusive bargaining agent which represents more than 50 percent of the 
producers and 50 percent of the milk supplied. It would prohibit milk 
purchases by handlers below the negotiated price. There are no provisions 
for production controls, anti-trust exemptions or extension of market 
orders to other commodities. 
In milk, the bargaining activities in the public policy arena influencing 
market order prices and support levels plus super pool premium pricing to 
handlers have improved dairymen's incomes to the extent a production 
response is occurring. As a result, the milk producers are considering 
programs for restricting output or. entry. We may see the bargaining approach 
in milk evolving toward a marketing board. 
Marketing Boards 
Though the U.S. has never established a marketing board many nations 
have developed mechanisms called marketing boards and given them much 
power. Hog producers in the Province of Ontario have had a marketing 
board for a good many years. They are not truly an alternate to marketing 
orders and voluntary associations but would tend to concentrate the kinds 
of authorities or power considered necessary to accomplish the purposes. 
Marketing boards may be described as producer controlled, horizontally 
organized, compulsory marketing organizations established under legal author-
ity to perform marketing operations for the producers of a farm commodity. 
The rationale for marketing boards is in terms of strengthening the bargaining 
power of producers, income improvement, and supply control. The supply 
management may be accomplished through various methods like price discrimi-
nation, collective bargaining, sales quotas on output, control of inputs 
like allotments on land, restricting entry of new producers, or some 
combination of the foregoing. 
Senator Mondale's bargaining bill would create a five member appointed 
board. Upon petition of producers, and if the board found that price was 
below a fair and reasonable level, the board could conduct a referendmn 
to secure majority approval. The board would supervise the election of 
the bargaining conunittee. The board would then certify both the producer 
and handler co111Dittees, and appoint the exclusive bargaining agent. The 
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bill provides for compulsory settlement provisions, prohibits purchases 
below negotiated prices, provides for all commodities to be included in 
marketing orders, includes production control options, and provides anti-
trust exemptions. 
SUMMARY 
The debate on the pros and cons in collective farmer bargaining has 
diminished somewhat in recent years. The current discussion centers 
on how, where and when bargaining may have a role to play. The debate 
tends to be ctirected toward such questions as ''Who shall do the bargaining?" 
''How shall the bargaining relationship by set up?" "Can bargaining be 
voluntary?" "Must we have majority rule?" "How do we arbitrate disputes?" 
"How do we choose or dismiss a bargaining coumittee?'' and numerous other 
questions. 
In the final analysis, farmer bargaining will be judged by its effects 
on improving farmer's income, on farmers traditional independence, avoiding 
loss of foreign markets, assuring consumers an adequate food supply at 
acceptable prices, providing an orderly flow to market and in coordinating 
the economic system. 
The potentials and pitfalls in farmer bargaining are real and vary 
widely by colll1IOdities. The variations are due to differing conmodity 
market price structure, market organization and coordination, supply 
conditions, producer responses and consumer reactions. 
We have made only passing reference or omitted all together other 
important aspects of bargaining like the organizational structure, leader-
ship and membership conmitments, organizational· costs, single versus 
multiple conmodity bargaining groups, and numerous other aspects that need 
serious consideration by commodity groups contemplating bargaining. Whether 
the livestock industry moves or does not move toward bargaining depends 
upon you--the leadership. The kind of_ economic organization and pricing 
mechanism can be influenced. You should have a role in its determination. 
